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Recent Developments 
Duvall v. McGee: 
Tort Judgment Creditors Are Not Included in the Narrow Class of Creditors 
Entitled to Invade a Spendthrift Trust 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held tort 
judgment creditors are not included 
in the narrow class of creditors 
entitled to invade a spendthrift trust. 
Duvall v. McGee, 375 Md. 476, 826 
A.2d 416 (2003). The court deter-
mined the rationale underlying 
decisions permitting invasion of a 
spendthrift trust for payment of ali-
mony' child support, or taxes are not 
applicable to an obligation owed to 
ordinary creditors. Id. 
James McGee ("McGee") was 
convicted of felony murder for his 
participation in a robbery that resulted 
in the death of Katherine Ryon 
("Ryon"). Robert Duvall ("Duvall"), 
Personal Representative ofRyon's 
Estate, brought suit in the Circuit 
Court for Anne Arundel County 
seeking compensatory and punitive 
damages. The parties executed a 
settlement agreement for a judgment 
against McGee. 
The settlement agreement 
acknowledgec McGee as the 
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust 
(''Trust'') established by his deceased 
mother. Under the Trust's terms, 
McGee was prohibited from alienating 
Trust principal or any other portion of 
the Trust while in the hands of the 
Trustee, and specifically shielded 
Trust principal and income from 
McGee's creditors. Additionally, 
periodic income payments were made 
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to McGee by the Trustee. Pursuant 
to the settlement agreement, Duvall 
was prohibited from attaching or 
garnishing the periodic payments 
made to McGee by the Trustee. 
To satisfY the judgment entered 
pursuant to the settlement agreement, 
Duvall served a Writ of Garnishment 
on the Trustee to invade the Trust 
principal. Duvall moved for summary 
judgment, arguing as a matter of 
public policy tort judgment creditors 
should be deemed a special class of 
creditors entitled to invade a 
spendthrift trust. The court denied 
Duvall's motion for summary 
judgment and granted McGee's 
cross-motion. Duvall appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland; however before it was 
heard, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by recognizing spendthrift 
trusts are valid instruments under 
Maryland law. Id. at 483-84, 826 
A.2d at 420. The court concluded 
principal of a spendthrift trust is not 
subject to garnishment while in the 
hands of a trustee. Id. (citing Smith 
v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497 
(1888». The court reasoned although 
the right to sell and dispose of 
property is a necessary incident to 
absolute ownership of property, ''the 
reasons on which the rule is founded 
do not apply to the transfer of 
property in trust." Id. at 485, 826 
A.2d at 421 (quoting Smith, 69 Md. 
at 87, 14A.2d at 499). Moreover, 
the court determined the only restraint 
on the right to dispose of trust 
property is when it is in the best 
interest of the community. Id. 
As such, the court identified 
three circumstances where it had 
held, on public policy grounds, 
spendthrift trusts may be invaded for 
indebtedness: (1) alimony arrearage; 
(2) child support; and (3) income tax. 
Id. at 489, 826A.2dat423-24. The 
court recognized a fundamental 
difference between these obligations 
and those of ordinary creditors. Id. 
at 489,826 A.2d at 424. The court 
reasoned a beneficiary's wife and 
children are not creditors and the 
beneficiary'S liability to support them 
is not a debt. Id. at 493,826 A.2d 
at 426. "The obligation to pay 
alimony in a divorce proceeding is 
regarded not as debt, but as a duty 
growing out of the marital relation and 
resting upon sound public policy." Id. 
at 491, 826 A.2d at 425. Similarly, 
the court recognized the obligation to 
pay taxes is not considered debt, nor 
is the government viewed as a mere 
creditor. Id. at 493, 826A.2d at 426. 
The court reasoned the obligation 
owed to ordinary creditors, however, 
grows out of contract, not statutory, 
duty. Id. at 492,826 A.2d at 425. 
Upon finding Ryon was only an 
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ordinary creditor, the court held 
McGee's obligation was dissimilar to 
cases where invasion of a spendthrift 
trust was allowed for payment of ali-
mony, child support, or taxes. Id. at 
493, 826 A.2d at 426. 
Therefore, the court concluded 
the Trust had no duty to Ryon'sestate. 
Id. The court reasoned to allow the 
invasion of the Trust for payment of 
the tort judgment against McGee 
frustrates the Trust donor's intent and 
would, in effect, impose liability on the 
Trust for the beneficiary's wrongful 
acts. Id. 
The court rejected Duvall's next 
argument that certain creditors' 
interests are great enough to usurp 
spendthrift trust terms. Id. at 494, 
826 A.2d at 427. The court opined 
ordinary creditors are on notice of a 
spendthrift trust when they voluntarily 
extend credit and are able to regulate 
conduct in light of this information Id. 
at 499, 826 A.2d at 429. Although 
the court admitted tort judgment 
creditors are not on notice, ''that fact 
alone does not make the claim ... 
anything other than a debt or make its 
exemption from the bar of a 
spendthrift trust, a matter of public 
policy." Id. at 500, 826A.2d at 430. 
To support this conclusion, the court 
focused on a Uniform Trust Act 
section 503 comment that specifically 
does not support including tort 
judgment creditors among creditors 
who can invade a spendthrift trust. Id. 
at 500, 826A.2d at 416 n.15. 
Finally, the court addressed 
Duvall's argument that, as a matter of 
public policy, McGee should not be 
allowed to receive benefits from the 
Trust to the exclusion ofhis creditors. 
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Id. at 500, 826 A.2d at 430. The 
court agreed Maryland public policy 
does not endorse a system where 
criminals derive financial benefit from 
their illegal activity, as evidenced by 
the "slayer's rule." Id. The court 
concluded, however, that any benefit 
McGee received from the Trust 
vested prior to the commission of his 
criminal acts and was completely 
independent of his criminal conviction 
Id. at 500-01, 826 A.2d at 430. The 
court stated situations where criminals 
were rewarded for criminal acts by 
way of book, television, and movie 
royalties were unlike this case because 
McGee derived no benefit from his 
criminal act. Id. Instead, the court 
concluded McGee only benefited as 
a life beneficiary under the Trust 
executed by his deceased mother. Id. 
at 501, 826 A.2d at 430-31. 
In Duvall v. McGee, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland declined to 
expand the narrow class of creditors 
allowed to invade spendthrift trusts. 
By doing so, the court drew a "duty-
debt" distinction for determining what 
is commensurate with public policy. 
As a result, this ruling preserves the 
right of spendthrift trust beneficiaries 
from having trust principal attached by 
tort judgment creditors. Thus, the 
court sent a message that unless a 
beneficiary has a statutory duty, the 
intent of a spendthrift trust settlor 
trumps creditors' interests. 
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